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Abstract—Mobility and security are very important services
for both current and future network infrastructures. However,
the integration of mobility in traditional virtual private networks
is difficult due to the costs of reestablishing broken secure
tunnels and restarting broken application connections. In order
to address this issue, we propose a new communication system
called Mobile User Secured Session. Based upon a peer-to-peer
overlay network, it provides security services to the application
layer connections of mobile users. The secure and resilient
sessions allow user connections to survive network failures as
opposed to regular transport layer secured connections. We have
implemented a prototype and have assessed its proper functioning
by running experimentations upon a simple virtual dynamic
network.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile equipments and wireless networks have progres-
sively provided a high connectivity for user connections.
However, such connectivity often comes at the expense of
vulnerabilities to attacks such as eavesdropping. Malicious
users can infiltrate untrusted dynamic networks and attack
communication between legitimate users. Virtual Private Net-
works (VPNs) are a technology which offers a high security
to the traffic [1]. Traditionally, these systems allow the user to
securely and remotely communicate with its Intranet through
insecure networks such as the Internet. Security services pro-
vided by these infrastructures are very robust against malicious
users’ attacks. However, traditional VPNs fail to support
the mobility of users. Indeed, network failures automatically
break-up secure tunnels and involve a subsequent negotiation
that is then necessary to reestablish broken tunnels. This
negotiation requires expensive computational operations in
order to restore tunnels as well as transport and application
layers’ connections. This phase of negotiation causes not only
significant latency but also presents risks of Man-In-The-
Middle attacks. Traditional VPNs can not therefore effectively
operate in dynamic environments.
In this paper, we propose a new mobile VPN system
called Mobile User Secured Session (MUSeS). This system is
designed to support both the mobility and the traffic security of
the user. MUSeS allows user connections to survive disruptions
caused by network failures or location changes.In addition, our
infrastructure has the ability to hide these disruptions from the
user. In this paper, our main contributions are structured as
follows:
• We first describe the design principles and architecture
of our system (Section II).
• We then experiment our secure session resilience mecha-
nism in a virtualized dynamic environment (Section III).
• We finally provide a background summary of prior and
related work (Section IV).
II. SYSTEM DESIGN
A. Overview
As shown in Figure 1, MUSeS is a communication system
directly used by the applications. MUSeS is using another
communication system called CLOAK which enables the cre-
ation and management of a P2P overlay network above any IP
network [2]. MUSeS is designed to provide traffic security and
session continuity. Applications produce data and send it to
the MUSeS middleware. Data is then sliced in packets that are
encrypted and authenticated. Unlike IPsec or TLS which rely
on IP addresses to define the identity of the communication
entities, MUSeS relies on permanent device identifiers called
names provided and managed by CLOAK. The MUSeS system
has the ability to support several simultaneous applications. In
addition, any application setting up a MUSeS session is able to
survive to network interruptions of any duration. It can keep
a user session active after a connection disruption and can
resume an interrupted session when the failed connection is
reestablished. Session resumption is performed without any
session key renegotiation.
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Fig. 1. Design overview.
B. CLOAK Overlay
CLOAK is an architecture for building P2P overlay net-
works which are autonomous and dynamic. A network node
can join any peer already inside the overlay usually by setting
up a transport layer connection such as TCP with this peer.
The new peer is then offered an address which is unique and
dependent on its location in the overlay. These addresses are
used by a greedy routing algorithm for forwarding the data
inside the overlay. In order to cope with network dynamics,
CLOAK provides a distributed algorithm for maintaining the
consistency of the assignment of the addresses to preserve
the greedy routing property. Because an address depend on a
peer’s location, it changes when the peer disconnects from its
neighbors and reconnects to new neighbors. To ease commu-
nication between peers, CLOAK assigns to each peer a name
which remains permanent during the lifetime of the overlay. In
order to be autonomous, CLOAK provides a DHT for mapping
the names of the peers to their addresses. These names are used
by MUSeS to setup a secure connection between two peers.
CLOAK was originally presented in our paper [3] which
contained an extensive amount of background and related
work as well as some preliminary simulation results upon
static networks concerning path length. Improving upon this
foundation, our paper [2] presented the protocols and modules
of the architecture with greater details and reported simulation
results upon dynamic networks concerning routing success ra-
tio, path length and stretch, as well as DHT performances. The
addressing and routing system based on hyperbolic geometry
which is used by CLOAK was presented in our paper [4]. Both
the distributed addressing algorithm and the greedy routing
algorithm are detailed in this previous paper and we have
not included them here for the sake of brevity. The DHT
scheme defined by CLOAK over this hyperbolic system is
fully explained in our paper [5].
The Figure 2 shows how a packet is forwarded between
the source and the destination. When a secure MUSeS node
A generates a packet to send to a distant node B, it locally
forwards the packet to the associated underlying CLOAK
node A’ via a loopback TCP connection. Next, the underlying
node A’ routes the packet to the destination through the P2P
overlay network consisting in chained TCP connections. The
CLOAK node B’, associated to the final destination MUSeS
node B, intercepts the packet and locally forwards it to B. The
P2P overlay network ensures therefore the proper routing of
MUSeS secured packets over the network.
CLOAK P2P overlay
MUSeS session
A
A' B'
B
Routing Process
Mobile secured data connection
Fig. 2. Routing through the P2P overlay network.
C. Architecture
The MUSeS system is based on three main components:
• The Session Security Module (SSM) manages security
services such as confidentiality, integrity and protection
against replay attacks.
• The Session Reliability Module (SRM) is designed to
provide fault-tolerant user sessions. In other words, SRM
offers user session continuity service that survives despite
connection disruptions caused by lower layers.
• The Local Connection Manager (LCM) handles multiple
local TCP connections in order to support several simul-
taneous user applications.
1) Session Security Module (SSM): The MUSeS security
module consists mainly in encrypting and decrypting traffic
payload as well as checking the integrity of the persistent fields
(sequence number, source and destination identifiers, source
and destination ports, ...) of each packet. All send/receive
operations between two users are performed through a secure
end-to-end tunnel. The SSM component protects the user’s
traffic against eavesdropping, modification attacks and replay
attacks. The goal of these protections is to prevent malicious
users from attacking legitimate users’ traffic.
Precisely, when Alice and Bob communicate, the data
exchanged by the two correspondents is encrypted and au-
thenticated. In other words, when Alice wants to send data
to Bob, for each packet that she generates, Alice encrypts the
payload and authenticates the encrypted payload and persistent
fields (SrcID, DstID, SessID, SeqNBR, ConTYPE, ...) of the
packet header. The authentication consists in computing a
digest on both the invariant fields and the encrypted payload.
The Integrity Check Value (ICV) thus obtained is added to
this packet.Before decrypting a received packet, Bob computes
an ICV and compares it with the ICV fixed on this packet
by Alice in order to check both authenticity and integrity. If
the check is successful, then Bob decrypts the payload of the
packet. Otherwise, the packet is assumed to be corrupted and
it is automatically destroyed. If the decryption process fails,
the packet is also destroyed.
The Routing Header (RH) used by the CLOAK overlay is
neither authenticated nor encrypted by MUSeS. Thus, each
intermediary overlay peer can update these values so as to
route packets towards the destination user. In order to avoid
replay attacks, SSM separately identifies each packet by a
sequence number (SeqNBR) and a session identifier (SessID).
The combination SeqNBR • SessID is unique to a MUSeS con-
nection. These values are authenticated because they belong
to the persistent fields. SeqNBR and SessID are therefore free
of modification attacks.
2) Session Reliability Module (SRM): The Session Relia-
bility Module or SRM is a MUSeS module which manages the
session continuity mechanism. SRM is able to detect network
failures and to suspend a communication for a long time.
It can keep interrupted sessions active and can reestablish
them subsequently. In addition, SRM permits also to hide
disruptions caused by lower layers to the application layer.
Therefore, SRM has the ability to make the failures occurred
at lower layers transparent to the users.
a) Interruption Detection: When a connection fails,
SRM has the ability to detect it. The destination unreachability
detection is made possible by an acknowledgment mechanism
that is based on the exchange of request-reply messages. When
there is a packet loss, detected by a lack of acknowledgment
or a waiting timeout, the communication will be temporarily
suspended.
Each peer concerned by an interrupted session attempts to
reestablish the connection with the corresponding peer. Its
sends Re-Hello packets at regular intervals of time to attempt
to restart the disrupted session as shown in Figure 3. In order
to check remote peer connectivity, Re-Hello messages contain,
among other fields, the sequence number of the last packet
correctly received or sent. The first peer that receives Re-Hello
request can reply to this message. When a peer replies to a
Re-Hello message, disrupted session is therefore resumed.
Fig. 3. Messages exchanged in the handshake and resumption phases.
b) Session Identifier: When a mobile MUSeS entity
wishes to communicate with a remote corresponding node,
these two peers compute together, in the handshake phase,
a unique value in order to singly identify each session
following the same principle as with a socket connection.
When Alice contacts Bob to communicate (handshake phase),
Alice generates a partial session ID (pSessID-a) and sends
it to Bob as shown in Figure 3. After receiving pSessID-
a, Bob generates also a partial session ID (pSessID-b) and
sends it to Alice. Each corresponding determines the final
session ID (SessID) by concatenating the partial session IDs:
SessID = pSessID-a • pSessID-b. To close this phase, Alice
sends a Finished message to Bob, and he sends the same
message to Alice. The communication, identified by a SessID,
can be therefore started between the two actors. Precisely,
a partial session ID (pSessID) is essentially computed by a
combination between a source port number (psN) and a peer
ID (pID): pSessID = psN • pID.
c) Acknowledgment Scheme: Based on a cumulative
acknowledgment scheme such as in the TCP protocol, the
MUSeS system sends one reply message when n packets have
been sent in order to optimize network bandwidth. When the
sender node sends n successive packets but it does not receive
an acknowledgment message from the receiver node before
the expiration of timeout, the corresponding node assumes
that the underlying CLOAK connection has failed and pauses
the traffic sending for the time necessary. The established
MUSeS session is kept active by the two correspondents until
the disrupted CLOAK path is restored. The acknowledgement
scheme is presented in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Acknowledgement Scheme.
Require: Max_i ≥ 0 ∧Max_j ≥ 0
repeat
i⇐ i+ 1 j ⇐ 1
pkt = packet.next_packet()
send_packet(pkt)
if i = Max_i or pkt.flag_last = true then
r ⇐ recv_ack_packet()
while r ∈ {timeout,¬ok} do
if j = Max_j then
session_close()
exit()
else
pause()
r ⇐ recv_ack_packet()
j ⇐ j + 1
end if
end while
i⇐ 0
end if
until pkt.flag_last = true
d) Secure Mobility: In our model, the concept of secure
mobility is a way to allow mobile users to keep an established
secure session active when the underlying system connection
fails until a subsequent new connection is started. In other
words, when a user changes its location as shown in Figure 4
or when its connections are disrupted by network failures, the
user session survives as long as necessary to resume the com-
munication. This ability prevents MUSeS connections from
breaking when the underlying topology changes.Therefore,
the session reestablishment is free from renegotiating secu-
rity parameters. To reestablish an interrupted communication,
the corresponding peers just need to exchange some session
resumption messages shown in Figure 3 in order to restart
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Fig. 4. User mobility with ongoing secure session.
the interrupted session at the point where the session was
suspended.
3) Local Connection Manager (LCM): The MUSeS system
is able to simultaneously support several user applications. The
MUSeS system and the user applications communicate through
local TCP sockets. Local TCP connections are managed by
the Local Connection Manager (LCM) as shown in Figure
5. Each user application is separately identified by its source
port. When data is received, the LCM module locally forwards
the data to the expected user application. The LCM builds a
hash table that associates each socket descriptor (value) with a
socket source port number (key). Socket source port numbers
are generated in a unique way by the OS. Source port numbers
contained in the hash table allow the LCM to identify the local
TCP socket descriptors corresponding to the proper destination
applications. When the SRM detects a connection disruption
or fails to reach the remote peer, it automatically notifies
the LCM. Then, the LCM suspends data reception from user
applications until the connection reestablishment. The local
socket is never closed by MUSeS (and it normally never fails)
unless the user wants to close it explicitly.
D. Security Analysis
Based on the use of standard cryptographic algorithms, our
system protects user communications from common traffic
attacks. The authentication of user applications is done through
public key cryptography where the CLOAK DHT is used as a
PKI. Finally, communications between the MUSeS middleware
and the local applications on a given machine are not secured.
These unprotected local communications may create security
issues. For instance, a local communication channel may be
intercepted by a malicious user in order to spy a connection
between two MUSeS users. We assume for the moment that
the risks of attacks against local connections are avoided by
the proper security of the machine itself.
E. Implementation
MUSeS is implemented as a middleware inserted between
user applications and our CLOAK P2P overlay middleware.
Currently, applications must use the MUSeS API to setup
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Fig. 5. Interaction between user applications and MUSeS.
secure and mobile sessions and thus must be recompiled.
Devices running these applications must run the CLOAK
middleware and belong to a CLOAK overlay. MUSeS is imple-
mented in the C language and consists in roughly 3000 lines
of code. The code can be viewed at [6]. It is only a preliminary
prototype implementation. The OpenSSL library is used by our
implementation in order to provide security services such as
protection against eavesdropping and protection against mod-
ification attacks. Traffic integrity is ensured by the HMAC-
SHA1 cryptographic function which seals each traffic packet
which implies that the two correspondents share a secret key.
Traffic confidentiality is ensured by the AES algorithm which
is used to encrypt the traffic payload. We currently assume
that the needed secret keys have been previously exchanged
securely by using public/private key signatures and encryption.
For testing and evaluating MUSeS, we have written a very
basic client-server application that is able to send a data
file over MUSeS. Furthermore, because CLOAK has only
be implemented inside simulators so far, there is no usable
CLOAK prototype and thus a static form of routing has been
implemented as a helper in the MUSeS prototype in order to
emulate the CLOAK layer.
III. EXPERIMENTATION
An experimentation has been carried out with the above
implementation in a dynamic environment composed of one
mobile node. The emulation of the dynamic environment is
done with our emulator nemu [7], a dynamic network emulator
using QEMU. A mobile node inside this environment has the
ability to leave one network (one virtual router) in order to
join another one (another virtual router). This event causes a
network failure during the move until a possible subsequent
reconnection. This disruption is transparent for the application
and it does not prevent the MUSeS system from continuing
to run despite the fact that the mobile node is disconnected
for a moment. Technically, in our experimentation shown in
Figure 6, the node’s mobility consists in causing an artificial
failure on a virtual network interface. We disconnect a virtual
wire from a virtual switch and reconnect it on another virtual
switch. The MUSeS system hides this network change not only
to the user’s application but also to the remote corresponding
node. The Figure 6 illustrates this network change scenario.
In this Figure, Bob communicates with Alice when he decides
to change its network location. He leaves the network on the
left side of router R5 and he joins the network on the left side
of router R4. This changing location causes a network failure.
However, this network disruption is transparent to both Alice
and Bob applications. Subsequently, Bob re-contacts Alice and
their session is therefore transparently resumed.
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Eve
Network changing
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Fig. 6. Location changing scenario
Figure 7 shows the evolution of the throughput between
the two corresponding applications over time. The network
interruption happens at 59 seconds after the start of the
experiment and the throughput instantly drops to zero. The
connectivity is reestablished at the network and CLOAK level
at 73 seconds and 82 hundredth. Because the CLOAK layer
is currently just an emulation, this time interval may be
greater when using the real implementation. After that, control
messages are exchanged at the MUSeS level in order to resume
the data transfer which finally happens at 76 seconds and 81
hundredth. Thus it takes 3 seconds to resume the transfer at
the MUSeS level.
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Fig. 7. Reconnection throughput vs time.
IV. RELATED WORK
Mobile VPN systems based on both IPsec [8] and Mobile
IP [9] have been proposed in [10], in order to attempt to
overcome traditional VPN inherent mobility drawbacks. Nev-
ertheless, this combination causes inconsistency problems [11]
between IPsec and Mobile IP. In order to overcome these
problems, another model has been proposed which is based on
the use of two HAs (internal HA and external HA) and two
FAs (internal FA and external FA) [12]. However, this model
imposes the use of three imbricated tunnels({x-MIP{GW{i-
MIP{original packet}}}}). In addition, an IPsec-based mobile
VPN requires n tunnels (n security layers) when there are
n IPsec hops between the source and destination entities.
Therefore, VPN systems based on this model suffer network
overhead.
Based on a topology organized in communities, P2P mobile
VPN systems have also been proposed such as ELA [13]
or N2N [14]. In opposition to most dynamic VPN systems,
these systems have the advantage to be scalable and to have
ability to communicate across NAT. Decentralized P2P VPN
infrastructures are a flexible and self-organized way that allow
users to create through untrusted network their own secure
network. N2N and ELA topologies are very similar despite
the fact that N2N is based on layer two whereas ELA is based
on layer three.
SIP-based mobile VPN systems have also been proposed in
the literature in [15] and [16]. However, the centralized model
(client/server architecture) of the session continuity protocol
(SIP) implies scalability issues. In addition, proposed SIP-
based mobile VPN are only adapted to real-time applications.
FAST VPN [17] is a mobile VPN infrastructure designed
for domestic networks. This VPN system creates a virtual
Internet Service Provider (vISP) inside a private network. This
system allows to establish a secure VPN between users and a
vISP. This technical concept capitalizes not only on the high
security and privacy given by the VPN but also on the mobility
provided by the flexibility of wireless networks. However,
FAST VPN is not scalable and provides a restricted service
to a private network: it permits only to secure Internet access
through an untrusted private network.
The TLS protocol provides a way to resume a TLS session
without requiring session-specific state at the TLS server [18].
In contrast to this technique that stops a session and restarts
it later, our system has the ability to always maintain an
established session active despite connection failures or net-
work disruptions. MUSeS also makes connection disruptions
transparent to the application as opposed to the TLS protocol.
Mobile VPN architectures based on SSH and TLS protocols
are been proposed in [19] and [20]. These extensions of SSH
and TLS protocol allow session to survive network failures.
Designed to support resilient connections, mobile VPN pre-
sented in [20] can span several sequential TCP connections
in order to resist connection failure and IP address change.
Mobile VPN presented in [19] introduces a session resumption
concept in order so as to resume sessions without having to
renegotiate new session keys.
In opposition to aforesaid schemes, another interesting
mobile VPN architecture has been designed [21]. Based on
SOCKSv5 proxy, this mobile VPN model allows to authenti-
cate clients and to build a secure SSL tunnel between users
and a SSL gateway that protects their Intranet. However,
this system is not scalable and when the SSL gateway is
compromised then the entire network will be affected.
There are many other solutions that provide mobility ser-
vices such as session-based mobility [22], the persistent con-
nection model [23] and session layer mobility (SLM) [24].
Although these systems do not offer security services, they
allow session continuity despite connection failures.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a new security and mobility
system called MUSeS based on a P2P overlay system called
CLOAK. MUSeS provides secure and resilient sessions to
the applications run by mobile users. In other words, user
sessions can be paused for any period of time and can be
restarted without the cost of renegotiating security parameters.
In addition, the MUSeS system makes lower layers disruptions
transparent to user applications and to remote corresponding
peers. MUSeS has also the ability to handle multiple local TCP
connections in order to support simultaneously several user
applications. We have designed and implemented a prototype
of our system and we have assessed it in an emulated dynamic
network environment.
Our future work will consist in completing and improving
the current implementation as well as integrating a public key
management scheme suitable for dynamic networks to provide
the users with a means to exchange secret keys in-band. We
plan to use certificate-less public key management techniques
to solve traditional key management issues.
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